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Abstract
This paper presents a model of the banking sector that maximize profit
and an individual bank which is a price taker, in a developing country. The
interest rate on treasury bills is included in the model to measure mon-
etary policy. The mathematical expression of the probability of banking
failure is calculated; And, I show that, in developing countries, a tighten-
ing monetary policy may induce efficient banking failure.
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1 Introduction
Some empirical and theoretical papers study the causes of banking crisis. Em-
pirical studies emphasize the role of the banks conditions as principal factors.
Wheelock and Wilson [13] find that bank specific data are significant factors of
US bank failures and acquisitions. Arena [1], for instance, reveals that bank-
level fundamentals significantly affect banking failure in East Asia and in Latin
America. About the macroeconomic conditions, one of the factors of banking
crises mentioned by Mishkin [9] is high interest rates.
Kraft and Galac [8] analyze deposit interest rates and banking failure that
become high because of liberalization and competition in Croatia. Actually, in
addition of liberalization and competition, a tightening monetary policy may
induce increasing of interest rates. Some researchers analyze the way monetary
policy affects balance sheets and the behavior of banks. For instance, Kashyap
and Stein [7] examine the impact of monetary policy on bank’s balance sheets.
Bolton and Freixas [3] analyze the effects of monetary policy on securities mar-
ket and bank lending. These papers, however, do not analyze the impact of
monetary policy on banking failure. To my knowledge, no other paper presents
a theoretical framework of linkage between monetary policy and banking failure.
This paper fill this gap; I show that, in developing countries, a tightening
monetary policy may induce efficient banking failure. Hancock [6] and Goyeau
et al. [5] analyze bank profitability and interest rates. But, they do not analyze
banking failure. Even if there is a link between profitability and solvency, they
are different. A bank may be solvent in spite of making losses, if equity is still
positive. The empirical results of Goyeau et al. [5] reveal that a decrease of
interest rate in Europe has a negative effect on some banking systems whereas
some other banking systems still profit. However, according to Hancock [6]
bank profit appears to increase with interest rate, which contradicts Goyeau
et al. [5]. Thus, the question still remains for research: Does bank profitability
increase when interest rates are raised? If some banks profit from interest rates
increasing whereas some other banks do not, what can explain this difference?
Beyond these questions, this paper is more concerned about the followings:
Is the impact of a tightening monetary policy on banking failure identical for
all banks? If there is a difference, what explains it? I show that a tightening
monetary policy, in developing country, may induce efficient banking failure.
Regarding firms, one of the main findings of Bernanke and Gertler [2] is that
a shortage of money, which increases interest rates, reduces their net worth.
However, there is no theoretical framework about the linkage between monetary
policy and individual banking failure. Those questions are essential, as banking
failure has economic and social consequences.
The model presented in this paper show that a tightening monetary pol-
icy may induce efficient banking failure, in developing country. Actually, the
model shows also that an efficient bank profit from a tightening monetary pol-
icy, whereas an inefficient bank does not. Thus, only inefficient banks should
fail because of a tightening monetary policy, in developing country. The paper
is organized as follows: after this introduction, the second section presents the
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model, and the third one exposes some concluding remarks.
2 The Model
This section presents a model of the banking sector that maximize profit and
an individual bank which is a price taker. In this model, prices are interest
rates on treasury bills, loans, and deposits. All interest rates are determined
by the banking market, except interest rate on treasury bills. I show that, in
developing countries, a tightening monetary policy may induce banking failure.
2.1 The Banking Sector
I assume that the banking sector is a competitive market. Secondary market is
not included in the model, because I consider developing countries, where the
secondary market is not well developed or does not exist at all. The banking
sector has three assets: loans (
∑
L), treasury bills (
∑
B), and reserve (
∑
R).
In the liability side of the sector’s balance sheet there are the shareholders equity
(
∑
K) and deposits (
∑
D). The reserve of the banking sector is a proportion of
deposits. The reserve rate is denoted α. Central bank requires from the banking
sector a capital adequacy which should be superior or equal to a proportion of
risk-weighted assets (denoted φ) .
Reserve: ∑
R = α
∑
D (1)
Capital requirement:
φ(σl
∑
L+ σb
∑
B) ≤
∑
K
σl and σb are the risk-weight of loans and treasury bills, respectively. It is
assumed that the risk-weight of loans is identical for all banks. Because treasury
bills are risk-free, σb = 0. Thus, the capital requirement inequality becomes:
φσl
∑
L ≤
∑
K (2)
The balance sheet identity:∑
L+
∑
B +
∑
R =
∑
K +
∑
D (3)
In the balance sheet identity (equation 3), I replace reserve(
∑
R) by its value
from equation 1. It is assumed that all banks maintain the shareholders equity
equal to the minimum of capital requirement, φσl
∑
L.1 Thus,
∑
K is replaced
1One of the propositions proved by Rochet [10] is that under deposit insurance, commercial
bank’s optimal behavior is to maintain capital just sufficient for meeting capital requirement.
However, in developing countries, there is implicit deposit insurance.
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by its value also.∑
L+
∑
B + α
∑
D = φσl
∑
L+
∑
D∑
L(1− φσl) +
∑
B =
∑
D(1− α)∑
B =
∑
D(1− α)−
∑
L(1− φσl) (4)
The profit function of the sector is the following:∑
pi = rl(1− p)
∑
L+ rb
∑
B− rd
∑
D− γl
∑
L− γd
∑
D− p
∑
L (5)
The interest rates on loans, deposits, and treasury bills are respectively rl,
rd, and rb. The expected default rate of the banking sector is denoted p, and the
marginal costs of loans and deposits are respectively γl and γd. Marginal costs
are assumed to be constants. All banks face the same marginal costs whereas
the default rate, p, differs from bank to bank.2 As interest rate on treasury bills
is used as instrument of monetary policy in most developing countries, it is used
in this model as the indicator of monetary policy.
If equation 4 is replaced in the profit function, it becomes:∑
pi = rl(1− p)
∑
L+ rb(1− α)
∑
D − rb(1− φσl)
∑
L
− rd
∑
D − γl
∑
L− γd
∑
D − p
∑
L (6)
Proposition 1 The interest rates on loans and deposits are positive functions
of interest rate on treasury bills, and the costs of intermediation increases the
first one and decrease the second.
Proof: The problem of the banking sector is to maximize profit. To resolve it,
banking sector chooses the optimal amounts of loans and deposits. Thus, the
condition of first order is the following:
∂
∑
pi
∂
∑
L
= rl(1− p)− rb(1− φσl)− γl − p = 0
rl =
1
1− p [rb(1− φσl) + γl + p] (7)
∂
∑
pi
∂
∑
D
= rb(1− α)− rd − γd = 0
rd = rb(1− α)− γd (8)
Equation 7 shows that the risk-weighted capital requirement, φσl, reduces
interest rates on loans, whereas equation 8 indicates that the reserve rate, α,
reduces interest rate on deposits. Capital requirement constitute a cost sup-
ported by banks, as it restricts the bank to provide loans to a certain extent.
2The default rate is the ratio of loans not reimburse to total loans.
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Zarruk and Madura [14] find a similar result. The model develop in their paper
shows that capital regulation results in a reduced interest margin.
The reserve rate, α, which is equal or superior to the rate of reserve require-
ment, is also a cost, as banks do not get return from it. This cost is reported to
the depositors. Indeed, the interest rate paid to depositors is inferior to what
it should be if there was not any reserve in the assets of the banks. Regarding
the costs of financial intermediation, only the customers support them. These
costs reduce interest rate they should receive on deposits, and increase what
they should pay on loans. In addition, the expected default rate is added to the
interest rate that banks’customers paid on loans.
2.2 An Individual Bank
In this subsection, a bank profit and its probability of failure are modeled.
All variables are used without the sum symbol in order to indicate that only
one bank is considered instead of the banking sector. The bank is a price
taker. Thus, interest rates received on loans and paid on deposits are those
determined by the market (equations 7 and 8), whereas the value of the interest
rate on treasury bills is decided by central bank. The default rate of the bank
is p. The managers of the bank know the true value of p when it is realized.
This subsection models the individual bank as follows:
Reserve:
R = αD (9)
Capital requirement:
φσlL ≤ K (10)
The balance sheet identity:
L+B +R = K +D
In the balance sheet identity, reserve (R) is replaced by its value from equa-
tion 9, and K by its value from equation 10.3
L+B + αD = φσlL+D
L(1− φσl) +B = D(1− α)
B = D(1− α)− L(1− φσl) (11)
The profit function of the bank is written as follows:
pi = rl(1− p)L+ rbB − rdD − γlL− γdD − pL (12)
3Remember that it is assumed that all banks maintain the exact minimum of capital
requirement.
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In the profit function (equation 12), interest rates on loans and deposits are
replaced by their respective value which are in equations 7 and 8. Thus, the
profit function of the bank becomes4:
pi =
p− p
1− pL[1 + (1− φσl)rb + γl] (13)
The gap between the expected default rate of the banking sector and the
default rate of an individual bank, p− p, is the relative efficiency of this bank.
Proposition 2 When central bank tightens monetary policy, by increasing in-
terest rate on treasury bills, depending on bank’s relative efficiency, three cases
are possible, regarding profit.
Proof: The partial derivative of the profit function of the bank, with respect to
interest rate on treasury bills, is the following:
∂pi
∂rb
=
p− p
1− pL(1− φσl) (14)
1. If the relative efficiency of the bank is negative, i.e, p−p < 0, a tightening
of monetary policy will increase the bank’s losses.
∂pi
∂rb
< 0
2. If the relative efficiency of the bank is null, i.e, p − p = 0, a shock of
monetary policy will have no impact on the profits of the bank.
∂pi
∂rb
= 0
3. If the relative efficiency of the bank is positive, i.e, p − p > 0, its profits
will increase when central bank tightens monetary policy.
∂pi
∂rb
> 0
Proposition 3 An increase of interest rate on treasury bills which is a restric-
tive monetary policy increases the probability of failure of the bank.
Proof: I consider that a bank fails when it is insolvent. Thus, the bank is
insolvent if the sum of shareholders equity and profit is negative. The probability
of failure of the bank, which is denoted ρ, is calculated as follows:
ρ = P (K + pi < 0) = P (pi < −K)
ρ = P
(
p− p
1− pL [1 + (1− φσl)rb + γl] < −K
)
ρ = P
(
p− p < −K
L
1− p
1 + (1− φσl)rb + γl
)
(15)
4See appendix for details about calculus.
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Equation 15 shows that the probability of failure is the probability that the relative
efficiency is inferior to a threshold which is denoted T , with:
T = −K
L
1− p
1 + (1− φσl)rb + γl
Thus, the probability of the failure of the bank, ρ, is:
ρ = P (p− p < T )
The gap between the expected default rate of the banking sector and the default
rate of the individual bank is defined by the interval I = [−1, 1]. It is assumed
that this gap is distributed as a uniform law. Thus, the probability can be ap-
proximated as follows5:
ρ = P (p− p < T ) ≈ P (−1 ≤ p− p ≤ T )
ρ =
T − (−1)
1− (−1) =
1
2
(T + 1)
ρ = −K
2L
1− p
1 + (1− φσl)rb + γl +
1
2
(16)
The partial derivative of the probability of failure can now be calculated with
respect to interest rate on treasury bills.
∂ρ
∂rb
=
K
2L
(1− φσl)(1− p)
[1 + (1− φσl)rb + γl]2 > 0 (17)
This last result (equation 17) indicates that an increase of interest rate on
treasury bills, i.e, a restrictive monetary policy, increases the probability of
banking failure. This increase is identical to the increase of probability that
the relative efficiency of a bank is inferior to the threshold, T . The probability
of banking failure increases after an increase of interest rate. Actually, I show
that the increasing of interest rate induces a decrease in relative efficiency of
the bank. When interest rates are high, risk averse agents prefer not to invest.
However, riskier agents are more willing to pay higher interest rates. Because
most of the agents that supply loans are the riskiest, banks tend to select a high
proportion of borrowers among them.
Proposition 4 An efficient bank decreases its loan portfolio to reduce its prob-
ability of failure when central bank tightens monetary policy.
Proof: I make the proof by calculating the impact of a variation of loans on the
probability of banking failure.
5This approximation implies that it is implicitly assumed that a bank is insolvent not only
when its net worth is negative, but also when it is null.
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∂ρ
∂L
=
K
2L2
[
1− p
1 + (1− φσl)rb + γl
]
> 0 (18)
The equation 18 shows that an increase of loans increases the probability
of bank failure. The inverse was true: a decrease of loans reduces the proba-
bility of banking failure. Thus, when central bank tightens monetary policy,
an efficient bank should decrease loans enough to decrease its probability of
failure. However, the probability of failure of inefficient banks that do not
decrease loans enough, after a tightening monetary policy, should increase.
This is concurrent with Caprio and Klingebiel [4] which reveal that one of
principal causes of bank insolvency is inefficient lending. It is also concurrent
with Stein [12] which argues that only “Good” banks lend less after a fall of
insured deposits.
The finding of Romer and Romer [11], nevertheless, differs from mine. Romer
and Romer [11] conclude that banks can use other financial sources to raise funds
and maintain loans at the same level when there is a shock to insured deposits.
Because the model I develop concerns developing countries, it is implicitly as-
sumed that there is not any alternative financial source. Actually, in developing
countries, sources for raising funds are limited. In addition, interest rates and
asymmetric information are usually high even before a shock of monetary policy,
in developing countries, which is not the same situation in developed countries.
A limitation of my model is that it does not account for time, which limited
the possibility to show the dynamic impact of monetary policy on banking
failure. Although static, the model meet the questions to which it intended to
answer; The model shows that the impact of a tightening monetary policy on
the probability of failure was not the same for all banks. In addition, it showed
the reason of this difference.
3 Concluding Remarks
The main result of the model is that a tightening monetary policy, in develop-
ing countries, induces efficient banking failure. Unlike inefficient banks, efficient
banks profit from a tightening monetary policy. The model shows that a tight-
ening of monetary policy causes failure of inefficient banks. Thus, in developing
countries, a tightening monetary policy, contributes to clean up the banking
system. It is efficient to eliminate bad banks in the banking sector. When a
tightening monetary policy induces banking failure of bad banks, it is an efficient
banking failure.
The model shows that some banks may profit from increasing of interest rates
whereas some other banks do not. The level of relative efficiency explained this
difference. Actually, a tightening monetary policy reduces the relative efficiency
of an individual bank. And the probability that the relative efficiency of a bank
is within the interval corresponding to failure, increases when central bank tight-
ens monetary policy. But, an efficient bank reduces its loan portfolio enough
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to stabilize its level of relative efficiency and its probability of failure. Thus,
only inefficient banks should fail because of a tightening monetary policy; A
tightening monetary policy induces efficient banking failure that clean up the
banking sector.
One of the implication of my model is that inefficient small banks become
more vulnerable to failure than inefficient big banks,when central bank tightens
monetary policy. Actually, big banks can invest in international markets easier
than small banks. Thus, they have more alternative choices than small banks.
Because their choices is narrow, small banks become more vulnerable to failure
after a tightening of monetary policy. In addition, loan portfolio of banks can
not be null; There is a threshold of interest rate, which I call a threshold of
crisis, that interest rate on treasury bills should not exceed. If the interest rate
exceeds this threshold of crisis, efficient small banks will fail. And, even efficient
big banks may fail, and systemic banking crisis may happen, depending on how
high the interest rate exceeds the threshold. Thus, in developing countries, a
tightening monetary policy induce efficient banking failure if interest rate on
treasury bills is equal to the threshold of crisis at most. Extended research will
analyze how monetary policy affect banking failure in developed countries.
A Calculus of the Profit Function of the bank
The profit function of the bank is written as follow:
pi = rl(1− p)L+ rbB − rdD − γlL− γdD − pL (19)
In the profit function (equation 19) I replace interest rates on loans and
deposits by their respective value which are in equations 7 and 8. Thus, the
profit function of the bank becomes:
pi =
1
1− p (rb − rbφσl + γl + p)(1− p)L+ rb(1− α)D − rb(1− φσl)L
−rb(1− α)D + γdD − γlL− γdD − pL
pi =
1
1− p [rbL− rbφσl L+ γlL+ pL− rbpL+ rbφσlpL− γlpL− ppL
−rb(1− φσl)(1− p)L− γl(1− p)L− p(1− p)L]
pi =
1
1− p [rbL− rbφσlL+ γlL+ pL− rbpL+ rbφσllpL− γlpL− ppL
−rbL+ rbpL+ rbφσlL− rbφσlpL− γlL+ γlpL− pL+ ppL]
9
pi =
1
1− p [L(p− p) + rbL(p− p)− rbφσlL(p− p) + γlL(p− p)]
pi =
p− p
1− pL [1 + (1− φσl)rb + γl] (20)
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